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I Do Bank Holding Companies
I
I
Act as “Sources of Strength”
for Their Bank Subsidiaries?
HOSE WHO WISH to determine why banks
fail typically focus on the characteristics of
banks and their local markets that make them
vulnerable to losses.1 A key factor often over-
looked, however, is capital injections by share-
holders. A bank whose losses exceed its capital
need not fail, if its shareholders (existing or
new) inject sufficient additional funds to restore
its capital ratio to a level acceptable to the
bank’s supervisory agency. Likewise, the
shareholders of a bank with a positive, but
relatively low, capital ratio can always remove
it from its “problem bank” status by injecting
sufficient capital.
The 1980s were marked by large numbers of
bank failures and large shares of commercial
bank assets written off as losses compared with
the previous four decades. Taking advantage of
this opportunity for comparison, this paper
focuses on the incentives of bank holding com-
panies (BHC5) relative to those of other investors
to inject additional capital into troubled banks.
‘Bovenzi, Marino and McFadden (1983) and Demirguc-Kunt
(1989).
2Other types of BHC actions to aid troubled bank sub-
sidiaries, such as providing new management, are not
We test the hypothesis that capital injections
into troubled bank subsidiaries of BHCs are
larger than the capital injections into troubled
independents.
The hypothesis underlying this study is that
BHCs have strong incentives to maintain “favor-
able” reputations in the financial markets and
with the Federal Reserve Board (Board). In par-
ticular, BHCs want to maintain favorable reputa-
tions with the Board because, under general
criteria specified in the Bank Holding Company
Act, the Board has the authority to approve or
deny applications by BHCs to acquire additional
subsidiaries. IfBHCs inject relatively more capital
into their troubled banks, then it is argued that,
at least compared to owners of independent
banks, BHCs are “sources of strength” for their
bank subsidiaries. If BHC affiliation has no in-
fluence on the amount of capital injected into
troubled banks, then BHCs provide no more
support in this form for their subsidiary banks
than other bank owners.2
considered in this paper. Thus, BHCs may be sources of
strength in other ways, even if they do not inject more
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PRINCIPLE~ A GENERAL
DISCUSSION
The Federal Reserve Board issued a statement
on April 22, 1987, about the obligations of BHCs
toward their troubled bank subsidiaries. In sum-
mary, it said:
The statement reaffirmed a long-standing Board
policy that holding companies should use their
available resources to provide adequate capital
funds to their subsidiary banks during periods of
financial stress or adversity. The Board issued the
policy statement to remind holding companies of
its expectation that they provide financial and
managerial strength to their subsidiary banks.’
BHCs may take various types of actions to aid
their troubled bank subsidiaries besides capital
injections. This statement, however, indicates
that the Board expects BHCs to employ this
method of assistance if losses reduce the banks’
capital ratios below acceptable levels.
The Board also has cited the principle of
source of strength in denying some applications
for the formation of BHCs. In these cases, the
Board projected that the dividends from bank
subsidiaries necessary to sevice the debt of the
new BHCs would reduce the capital ratios of
the acquired banks to unacceptably low levels.~
The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery
and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) makes a
weaker version of the source-of-strength princi-
ple a legal requirement for multi-bank holding
companies that own both solvent and insolvent
subsidiary banks. FIRREA requires that multi-
bank holding companies use the capital of their
subsidiary banks to cover the losses of each in-
dividual bank subsidiary. Thus, it has eliminated
the option of a multi-bank holding company to
abandon an individual subsidiary bank, thereby
leaving its negative net worth to be absorbed by
uninsured depositors or by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation while retaining its sol-
vent bank subsidiaries. FIRREA does not require
BHCs to use the capital of the parent organiza-
tion or nonbank subsidiaries to cover negative
net worth of their bank subsidiaries. The Fed-
eral Reserve Board’s standard for “source of
strength,” although not a legal requirement,
covers a broader range of circumstances, in-
cluding those in which the capital of a BHC’s
subsidiary bank, after absorbing losses, is low
but still positive. Also, the Board expects BHCs
to use all of their resources to aid their troubl-
ed bank subsidiaries, not just the capital of their
bank subsidiaries.
THE GENERAL HYPOTHESIS AND
ITS IMPLICATIONS
This paper investigates banks whose recent
losses are so large that they must either receive
capital injections or reduce their assets to meet
the minimum capital standards. During 1985-88,
the years covered by this study, the minimum
capital requirements of commercial banks were
specified in terms of the ratio of their primary
capital to their total assets. The major com-
ponents of primary capital are (1) equity capital
(investment by shareholders plus retained earn-
ings) and (2) loan loss reserve.
The minimum requirements set by the federal
supervisory agencies for all banks in 1985 called
for primary capital to be greater than or equal
to 5.5 percent of total assets. The supervisory
authorities indicated that even higher capital
ratios would be required for banks whose as-
sets were of relatively poor quality.’ Since the
banks in this study incurred large losses relative
‘Board of Governors (1987), pp. 71-72. See Duncan (1987)
and Bureau of National Affairs (1987) for legal interpreta-
tions of the Board’s statement. The Board also attempted
to force MCorp to act as a source of strength for its
bankrupt subsidiaries. See Bureau of National Affairs
(1989). In mid-May 1990, the Fifth Circuit U.S. Court of
Appeals ruled against the Federal Reserve in its suit
against MCorp. See Quint (1990). Despite this ruling,
BHCs still have incentives to maintain their reputations in
financial markets, and the Federal Reserve still has
authority to approve or deny any subsequent BHC
applications.
4These denials are based on projections of the payments
necessary to service the acquisition debt and the earnings
of the banks to be acquired, not on the records of the
BHCs in acting as sources of strength in the past. For a
recent case in which the Board applied this principle in de-
nying an application by a BHC, see the Federal Reserve
Bulletin (April 1990), pp. 257-58.
‘Gilbert, Stone and Trebing (1985). The bank supervisory
authorities also specified a minimum ratio of total capital
to total assets of 6 percent. Total capital includes primary
capital plus long-term debt of the bank that is subor-
dinated to its deposits. This paper does not consider the
adequacy of the total capital ratio or the incentives for








to their capital, their minimum primary capital
ratio is assumed to be C percent.°
Capital injections into independent banks
generally involve the sale of additional bank
stock to existing or new shareholders, BHCs
that own their bank subsidiaries outright, how-
ever, often inject capital into them directly,
leaving the number of shares outstanding un-
changed.’ When a BHC injects capital directly,
the transaction has the following effects on the
balance sheet of the BHC: a reduction in “cash”
and an increase in another category of assets
called “investment in subsidiaries.” On the sub-
sidiary’s balance sheet, the transaction involves
an increase in both its cash and its “equity capi-
tal.” In this paper, capital injections are mea-
sured as the sum of funds raised by issuing ad-
ditional shares and injecting capital directly.
WIGs and the Source of Strength
Hypothesis
BHCs have reasons to inject capital into their
troubled subsidiaries over and above those that
apply to individuals who own shares in troubled
independent banks. These reasons differ some-
what depending on whether the subsidiary
would actually fail or simply have low but posi-
tive capital ratios ~vithout a capital injection.
First, consider the incentives of BHCs. BHCs
wish to convince financial market participants
that they are strong, reliable organizations, in
order to reduce their borrowing costs and
possibly boost the price of their stocks. In sev-
eral cases, BHCs have covered the losses of
their subsidiaries’ creditors just to maintain
their reputations in the financial markets.’ As
previously discussed, BHCs also are concerned
about their reputations with the Federal
Reserve Board. Their ability to acquire sub-
sidiaries could be jeopardized if the Board views
their failure to support subsidiaries as a lack of
willingness to act as sources of strength.
Of course, individuals who own banks also
are concerned about their reputations with in-
vestors and with bank supervisors. The failure
of their banks will make it more costly for them
to raise funds in the future to buy other banks.
In fact, individuals with poor reputations with
bank supervisors may be barred from buying
banks,’ Thus, whether BHCs have greater incen-
tives to recapitalize their troubled banks than
individuals who own troubled independents is
an empirical issue.
Up to now, the discussion has focused on
banks that would fail without capital injections.
Most banks in this study, however, had positive
primary capital after absorbing their losses,
even without capital injections. These banks can
raise their capital ratios by reducing their assets
or receiving capital injections. BHCs also have
reasons for injecting capital into these banks
that may not apply to individuals who own stock
in troubled independents. Increases in the capital
ratios of their subsidiary banks achieved through
reductions in assets, rather than by injections of
capital, may not demonstrate the BHCs’ ability
and willingness to act as sources of strength.’°
Thus, if BHCs do not inject additional capital,
they may be denied permission to acquire addi-















°Lossesrecognized in the current year reduce primary
capital, since they reduce either the loan loss reserve or
equity capital. Loans that are not collectible are declared
loan losses by bank management and charged against the
loss reserve, thereby reducing that component of primary
capital. A bank increases its loan loss reserve in the cur-
rent year though an expense item that is charged against
current income. Negative earnings in the current year,
perhaps because of a relatively large provision for loan
losses, reduce equity capital.
‘A BHC would inject capital into a bank subsidiary rather
than buy additional shares only if it owned all of the
bank’s stock. Qtherwise, a direct injection of capital is a
gift to other shareholders that increases the value of their
shares even though they have not increased their invest-
ment in the bank.
‘For a description of cases in which BHCs covered the
losses of their subsidiaries, rather than forcing the
creditors of their subsidiaries to absorb them, see Cornyn,
et al (1986), pp. 187-91. The authors interpret these ac-
tions as attempts by BHCs to portray themselves as
strong, reliable organizations that honor their obligations.
‘Individuals must apply to the supervisory authorities for
permission to buy controlling interest in banks. If in-
dividuals refuse to inject capital into their failing banks, the
supervisory authorities may block their acquisitions of
banks in the future. See Spong (1985), pp. 94-95.
10The Board’s record in acting on 81-IC applications to ac-
quire subsidiaries makes it difficult to provide a more
definitive description of the Board’s standards for source
of strength. In most cases in which the Board has stated
the principle of source of strength as the basis for denials,
the basic issue is excessive debt in the formation of one-
bank holding companies. Few denials have been based on
the failure of BHCs to act as sources of strength for their
bank subsidiaries.
“Note that the Board statement quoted above refers to the
use of “available resources to provide adequate capital
funds to their subsidiary banks during periods of financial
stress or adversity.” This statement could be interpreted
as indicating that a BHC would not be considered a source
of strength if it fails to inject capital into a subsidiary bank
with a low but positive capital ratio.
a JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1991The Issue of Size
BHCs differ greatly in terms of the magnitude
of their assets and the number of their subsidi-
aries. Many BHCs, for example, have only a
single subsidiary. The incentives for the owners
of such a one-bank holding company to inject
capital into their troubled subsidiary are likely
to be similar to those of individuals who own a
troubled independent. The failure of a BHC’s
sole subsidiary would have no adverse effects
on the BHC’s cost of funds because it would be
out of business as well. Moreover, a BHC with
only one subsidiary has certainly not shown
that it considers permission to acquire addi-
tional subsidiaries to be a valuable privilege.
For multi-bank holding companies, the incen-
tive to inject capital is presumably greater, the
larger are the total assets of all subsidiaries in
the BHC to the assets of its troubled subsidiary.
The prospective penalties imposed on a BFIC by
both the financial markets and the Board for a
failure to inject capital into a troubled subsidi-
ary are likely to be positively related to the total
assets of the BHC.” Thus, in modeling the de-
terminants of capital injections into troubled
banks, variables designed to reflect affiliation
with BHCs reflect the assets of BHCs relative to
the assets of their troubled bank subsidiaries.
Assessing the Financial Strength of
SHIlls
Capital injections by BHCs also are assumed to
be influenced by their own financial conditions.
If primary capital ratios at the other banks in a
BHC exceed the levels required by bank super-
visors, the BHC can channel capital from them,
via dividends, to the troubled subsidiary. Alter-
natively, a BHC with most of its subsidiaries in
strong financial condition could raise funds in
the financial markets at lower interest rates
(reflecting lower risk premiums) than BHCs that
have larger numbers of troubled banks.
In contrast, if the primary capital ratios of the
banks in a BHC are generally below required
levels, banks have little or no excess capital to
pay out as dividends to the BHC to channel to
its more troubled subsidiaries. Moreover, such a
BHC would have less incentive to promote its
reputation with the Board as a source of strength
by attempting to come to the aid of one of its
bank subsidiaries; the relatively low capital ra-
tios of its other subsidiaries clearly indicate that
the BHC is not in a position to act as a source
of financial strength.
A FORMAL SPECIFICATION OF
THE BANK CAPITAL INJECTION
MODEL
Equation 1 presents the model of the deter-
minants of capital injections into troubled banks
used in this study.
++ +
(1) INJ = frnHcslo, RFICSSO, RHCSIOO,
++ + +
RHCS100+, FSHC, NINJ, ROA)
The variables used are defined below: the signs
above the variables in equation 1 show the ex-
pected signs of their estimated coefficients.
INJ the ratio of the capital injected into a
bank to the total assets of the bank at the end
of the prior year.
RHCS1O = dummy variable with a value of uni-
ty if the ratio of total banking assets of a BHC
to the assets of its troubled bank subsidiary
(RHCS) is greater than unity but less than 10,
zero otherwise.
RHCSSO = dummy variable with a value of uni-
ty if RHCS is greater than or equal to 10 but
less than 50, zero otherwise.
RHCS100 = dummy variable with a value of
unity if RHCS is greater than or equal to 50 but
less than 100, zero otherwise.
RHCS100+ = dummy variable with a value of
unity if RHCS is greater than or equal to 100,
zero otherwise.
FSHC = the ratio of the sum of primary capital
of banks in the BHC, other than the troubled
banks included in this study, to the sum of
their total assets.
NINJ = the ratio of the capital injection neces-
sary to make primary capital equal to C percent
“While it is impossible to determine the value of future ac-
quisitions to a 81-IC without knowing its plans, a
reasonable guess might be that BHCs that have grown
large through acquisitions would place higher value on the
privilege to make additional acquisitions than BHCs that
have made fewer acquisitions. Under this assumption, the
penalty for not investing in a troubled subsidiary in the
form of foregone opportunities for future acquisitions is
proportional to the total assets of the BHC.
6 I
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of total assets as of the end of the prior year, to
their total assets at the end of the prior year.
ROA = the ratio of net income of the banks in
the county of a troubled bank, other than the
troubled bank itself, to their total assets. Income
is measured over the calendar year prior to the
year in which the bank becomes a troubled
bank, and total assets are measured at the end
of that year.
Identjfication of Troubled Banks
and the Measure of capital
Injections
Equation 1 is designed to explain capital injec-
tions into a specific group of banks — those
whose primary capital ratios initially exceeded 6
percent but who had losses in the current year
that drove their primary capital below 6 per-
cent. To raise their capital ratios up to 6 per-
cent, these banks must receive capital injections
or reduce their assets. The capital injected into
each bank is measured as the sum of capital in-
jections over four quarters, beginning in the
quarter in which the losses reduced their pri-
mary capital below 6 percent of their total as-
sets in the initial period.
Each bank included in the study had, at the
end of the prior year, primary capital that ex-
ceeded C percent of its total assets, as illustrated
in inequality 2.
(2) 0.06A0 < C,,
where
A, = total assets in the last quarter of the
prior year,
C, = primary capital in the last quarter of the
prior year.
Then, during some quarter of the current
year, each bank in the study had losses suffi-
cient to reduce its primary capital (net of any
capital injection in that quarter) below C per-
cent of its total assets at the end of the prior
year (A0), as illustrated in inequality 3.
(3) 0.06A, > [C, — 1,1,
where
C, = primary capital in the first quarter of
the current year (quarter t) in which
this inequality holds,
I, = capital injections in the first quarter of
the current year (quarter t) in which this
inequality holds.
Capital injections in quarter t are subtracted
from the right side of inequality 3 because some
banks inject capital immediately to cover at least
part of their losses; in fact, if they inject enough
capital, their primary capital would not actually
fall below 6 percent of A,. Yet these banks
should be included in the analysis because they
received large capital injections to offset large
losses.
In deriving values of the dependent variable,
capital injections are summed over four quarters,
primarily because of the typical timing of the
capital injections. Most capital injections occurred
in the fourth quarter of the year in which losses
reduced the primary capital of a bank enough
to satisfy inequality 3. Of the 256 banks in this
study that received capital injections, 238 re-
ceived capital injections during this quarter,
regardless of the actual quarter in which the in-
equality first held. Moreover, 221 of these re-
ceived their only capital injection in that fourth
quarter. Given this timing, a four-quarter period
starting with the quarter in which each bank
satisfies inequality 3 is adequate for examining
capital injections into troubled banks. Thus,
capital injections are measured as the sum of
capital injections in quarter t through n-3. The
equation for calculating the dependent variable,
INJ, is specified in equation 4:
3
(4) INJ = 1 I,÷~/A,
j=0
Because the capital injections are summed
over four quarters, an additional constraint is
imposed on the balance sheets of the banks in-
cluded in this study: their primary capital in
quarter t+ 3 (net of capital injections in quarters
t through t+3) must be less than 6 percent of
A0, their total assets at the end of the year be-
fore their large losses. This is because banks
may have increased their primary capital in
quarters t+ 1 through H- 3 in ways that do not
involve explicit capital injections; among these
are positive earnings that are retained, recover-
ies on loans previously charged off as losses and
changes in accounting practices. Such changes
in primary capital after quarter t will affect the
amount of capital injections needed to meet
their capital requirements. This condition is
stated in inequality 5:
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and 5 are excluded from this study because
they were involved in mergers or were pur-
chased by new owners around the time of their
losses.” including these banks would have po-
tentially biased the results of this study- Sup-
pose, for instance, that troubled banks sold to
new owners are acquired by BHCs that injected
additional capital into their new bank subsidi-
aries. Including these banks in the study would
exaggerate the significance of BHCs as sources
of strength for their existing bank subsidiaries.
In deriving the dependent variable, INJ, the
dollar value of capital injections is divided by A,
to create a measure of capital injections that is
unaffected by contemporaneous changes in total
assets. Using the total assets existing when the
capital injections were made could bias the
estimate of the effects of affiliation with BHCs
on the size of capital injections.
Suppose, for example, that BHCs inject enough
capital into their troubled subsidiaries to meet
capital requirements without reducing their
assets, while shareholders of independent banks
choose combinations of capital injections and
reductions in assets. Deflating capital injections
by the total assets when such injections are
made would bias downward the estimate of the
effect of affiliation with BHCs on the size of
capital injections. Deflating by A, avoids this
potential bias.”
Relative Size of BHC’s and Their
Troubled Bank Subsidiaries
Equation I includes dummy variables for dif-
ferent levels of RHCS — the ratio of the total
banking assets of the BHC to the assets of its
troubled subsidiary. These dummy variables
apply only to multi-bank holding companies. No
subsidiaries of one-bank holding companies are
included in the study because all that met the
inequality conditions were sold around the time
they became troubled banks.
If BHCs as a group inject more capital into
their troubled bank subsidiaries than other
bank owners, the coefficients on the dummy
variables for RHCS will be positive and statisti-
cally significant. Moreover, as explained previ-
ously, the coefficients are expected to be larger
for higher values of RHCS.
Financial Strength of the BIB?
(FSHC)
FSHC reflects the financial strength of BFICs;
it is measured as the ratio of the primary capi-
tal of the banking subsidiaries of a BHC — other
than that of their troubled bank subsidiaries in
this study — to their total assets. The primary
capital and total assets values used are those in
the fourth quarter of the year prior to the year
in which the subsidiary first satisfies inequality
3. For troubled banks that are not subsidiaries
of BHCs, FSHC has a value of zero.
“The following rules are designed to exclude banks that
were sold to new owners around the time they became
troubled banks. Each bank that was a subsidiary of a BHC
in 1985 must have been a subsidiary of the same BI-IC in
December 1983. Similarly, banks that were not affiliates of
BI-ICs in 1985 must also have been independent banks in
December 1983. In a similar fashion, subsidiaries of BHCs
included in the study for 1986 were affiliates of the same
BI-ICs as of December 1984 or were independent banks in
both periods. The rules for including banks in the study for
1987 and 1988 have similar timing.
Troubled independent banks that were sold to new
owners are not excluded from the study because it is more
difficult to obtain information on their ownership than on
that of BHCs. There are 113 banks that met the other
criteria for inclusion in the study that were excluded
because of changes in their ownership around the time
they became troubled banks. These 113 include 24 in
which multibank holding companies bought troubled in-
dependent banks. The multibank holding companies in-
jected capital into 19 of these banks.
14The possible distortions that would result from scaling
capital injections by total assets as of the time of the
capital injections can be illustrated by considering two
banks that are identical in every way other than the
response oftheir shareholders to losses. In December
1984, Bank A and Bank B had primary capital of $6 and
total assets of $100. In the first quarter of 1985, each had
a loss of $2, reducing primary capital to $4 and total
assets to $98. For the rest of 1985, loan losses and net in-
come were zero for each bank. During 1985, shareholders
inject $2 into Bank A, returning primary capital to $6 and
total assets to $100. Bank B receives a capital injection of
$1 during 1985 and reduces its assets by $15, raising its
primary capital ratio to approximately 6 percent [5/(100—2
+ 1—15) = 0-05951.
Since the capital injection into Bank Ai stwice that for
Bank B, the value of the dependent variable should be
twice as large for Bank A. If capital injections were
deflated by total assets as of the time of the capital injec-
tions, however, the ratio would be 0.02 for Bank A (2/100)
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Maintain the Prior Level of Total
Assets (NLVJJ
NINJ is defined and calculated as the capital
injection necessary to raise the troubled bank’s
primary capital to 6 percent of A, divided by
A,,15 The calculation of the values of NINJ is il-
lustrated in equation 6:
3
(C) NINJ = 0.06 — EC,÷, — 1 ~
j=0
NINJ is included as an independent variable in
the equation for capital injections to avoid possi-
ble biases in estimating the effect of BHC affilia-
tion on capital injections. For instance, suppose
that BHC subsidiaries require capital injections
of 4 percent of total assets (A,) to meet their
capital requirements without reducing their
assets, while independent banks need only 1
percent. Including the independent variable
NINJ controls for such differences.
Expected Future Profits
Bank losses may cause shareholders to lower
the future profits they expect their banks to
earn for a given level of assets, making them
reluctant to add capital into these banks. Alter-
natively, their expected profits may be unaf-
fected by current losses; in these cases, current
shareholders may add capital to offset part or
all of the reduction in primary capital.
The average rates of return on assets (BOA)
of other banks in the counties of the troubled
banks are used to indicate the prospects for
future profits. BOA is included to determine
whether shareholders of troubled banks located
in areas in which other banks have achieved
relatively high BOA are more likely to inject
capital into their banks.
THE DATA
Location and Size of the Banks
The study includes all banks located in the 20
states in table 1 in the years 1985-88 that meet
“Evidence in other studies is consistent with the hypothesis
that capital requirements influence capital injections. DahI
and Shrieves (1990) found that banks with capital ratios
below required levels were more likely to receive capital
injections than other banks. Mingo (1975) estimated
changes in bank equity capital as a function of several in-
dependent variables, including the capital requirements of
bank supervisors. Capital requirements were significant in
9
the various criteria. These 20 states permit mul-
tibank holding companies but do not permit
statewide branching. The restriction on state-
wide branching is important for the construction
of BOA, since data on the profit rates of individ-
ual branches are not available.
Information in table 1 highlights the deterio-
rating condition of banks in Texas over the per-
iod. In 1985, about 30 percent of the banks in
the study were Texas banks; by 1987 and 1988,
about two-thirds of them were located in Texas.
Table 2 shows the asset size of the banks in
the study. While the vast majority had total
assets under $100 million, a few had total assets
in excess of $1 billion.
Distribution of Banks by Capital
Injections ‘Vecessani to Meet
C~apitalRequirements (NJNJJ
The distribution of banks by values of NINJ,
the capital injection ratio necessary to raise the
primary capital ratio to 6 percent without re-
ducing total assets, is shown in table 3. Of the
1358 banks, 76 had such large losses that their
explaining changes in equity capital. Wall and Peterson
(1987, 1988) reported that changes in the equity capital
ratios of banks were influenced predominantly by capital
requirements of bank supervisors. These studies are con-
sistent with the hypothesis that capital requirements in-



















a 1A,manv,rornnnanv loqiprimary capital would have been negative with-
out capital injections. At the other extreme, 145
banks required capital injections that were less
than 1 percent of their total assets. Table 3
shows that values of NINJ are not clustered at
the extreme values.
Affiliation with Bank Holding
Companies
Table 4 indicates that about half of the Texas
banks and about 56 percent of the banks located
in the other states are subsidiaries of multibank
holding companies. The rest were independent.
THE RESULTS
‘Fable 4 provides a comparison of the in-
cidence of capital injections into independent
banks and subsidiaries of BHCs, ignoring other
determinants. The patterns of capital injection
frequency over time were different for banks in
Texas than for those in other states. For mdc-
pendent banks and subsidiaries of BHCs in Tex-
as, the percentages of banks receiving capital in-
jections declined over time. In each year, how-
ever, a higher percentage of BHC subsidiaries
than independent banks received capital injec-
tions, and the percentages were significantly
higher in 1986, 1987 and for the 1985-88 period
as a whole.
For banks in other states, there was no con-
sistent pattern over time in the incidence of
capital injections. As with the Texas banks, the
percentage of banks that received capital injec-
tions was higher each year for BHC subsidiaries
than for independent banks. The percentages
are significantly higher in 1985, 1987 and for
the 1985-88 period as a whole. Thus, these
direct comparisons show that, in general, a
larger proportion of BHC-owned troubled banks
received capital injections than did troubled
independents.
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I Results for the estimation of equation 1 for 1985 through 1988 are presented in table 5. Separate equations are estimated for Texas
I banks because the substantial deterioration of earnings and capital adequacy of the entire Texas industry in recent years may have in-
fluenced Texas shareholder ‘ incentive to in)ect
I capital into troubled banks. N Fhe results indicate that the effects of affilia-
tion with BHCs are qualitatively imilar for
I troubled banks whether in Te as or elsenhere. N BHC owned troubled banks do not receive
larger capital injections than independent banks, N
I holding constant the other determinants of capi- tal injections, when the total banking as ets of the BHCs are less than 10 times the total assets N
I of their troubled bank subsidiaries (RHCS1O). In both equations, the coefficients on BHCSIOO and N RHCS100 + are positive and statistically signifi-
cant, indicating that if the BHC’s total banking
I assets are at least 50 times a large as the assets of its troubled subsidiary, it injects more capital
into the subsidiary than do the owners of mdc-
I penden banks. Outside Texas, this condition N also holds for BHCs with total banking assets at N lea t 10 times the assets of their troubled banks’
subsidiaries. Thus, the decision to inject capital
I depends on the size of BHC relative to the ize of their troubled sub idiaries.
Fhe coefficients on the variable N NJ are posi-
I tive and significant in each equation, a the hypothesis suggested. How ver, the variable ____________________________________________
}SHC — the weighted average capital ratio of
I
the banking subsidiaries of BHCs, other than
tho e included in the study — does not help cx- N
aROA as a Determinant of Capital
Injections
The coefficient on BOA is significant for the
Texas regression but insignificant in the other.
An examination of the ROA variable suggests
that this reflects the sharp drop in profitability
of Texas banks relative to that at non-Texas
banks over the years covered by this study. The
decline in profitability among Texas banks (table
6) induced a corresponding decline in capital in-
jections by Texas bank owners (table 4)16
Alternative Specification
Table 5 represents one way to assess the im-
pact of BHC affiliation on capital injections into
troubled banks. It is possible, however, that the
coefficients on dummy variables for the ratio
RHCS in fact may reflect more than simply BHC
affiliation. Capital injections may actually be in-
fluenced by the absolute size of BHCs and, in-
14
Equation 7 examines this possibility by incor-
porating the asset size of troubled banks and
BHCs into the equation:
(7) INJ = f(S50-D1, 575-Di, S75+D1, SSOD2,
575-D2, S75+ ~D2,BHC100, BHCI000,
BHCI000+, NINJ, ROA).
The additional independent variables are:
Sso — dummy variable with a value of unity if
the total assets of the troubled bank are greater
than 825 million but less than or equal to $50
million, zero otherwise
S75 — dummy variable with a value of unity if
the total assets of the troubled bank are greater
than $50 million but less than or equal to $75
million, zero otherwise
S75 + — dummy variable with a value of unity
if the total assets of the troubled bank are
greater than $75 million, zero otherwise
Dl — dummy variable with a value of unity if a
bank is an independent bank, zero otherwise
‘°Oneway to separate the effects on capital injections of
variation in RCA across counties from the effects of
changes in average RCA over time is to add dummy
variables for individual years as independent variables. In
regressions not reported here, dummy variables for in-
dividual years are added as independent variables to the
equations estimated in table 5. In those regressions, the
coefficient on RCA is insignificant for the Texas equation
and remains insignificant in the other equation. Thus, after
allowing for different capital injection ratios in different
years, differences in RCA across the counties in which the
troubled banks were located did not help explain dif-




plain differences in capital injections among
troubled banks. When FSHC was added as an
independent variable to the equations in table 5,
its estimated coefficient was not significantly
different from zero in either equation.
dependent of BHC affiliation, by the size of
troubled banks themselves. Such separate size
effects might well confound the interpretation
of the RHCS dummy variables.
aI 15
D2 — dummy variable with a value of unity if a
bank is a BHC subsidiary, zero otherwise
BHC100 — dummy variable with a value of uni- ty if the troubled bank is a subsidiary of a BHC with total banking assets of $100 million or less,
zero otherwise
BHC1000 — dummy variable with a value of
unity if the troubled bank is a subsidiary of a
BHC with total banking assets greater than $100
million but less than or equal to $1 billion, zero
otherwise
BHCI000 + — dummy variable with a value of
unity if the troubled bank is a subsidiary of a
BHC with total banking assets greater than $1
billion, zero otherwise.
Table 7 indicates that capital injection ratios
are larger for subsidiaries of the larger BHCs.
Among Texas banks, capital injections increase
if they are subsidiaries of BHCs with total assets
over $100 million. For banks in the other states,
capital injections are larger if banks are in sub-
sidiaries with total assets in excess of $1 billion.
The BHC effect on capital injections, however,
is not just a matter of BHC size. Table 7 also in-
dicates that, holding constant the size of the
BHC, the larger BHC subsidiaries have lower
capital injections ratios. Coefficients on dummy
variables for the size of independent banks are
not statistically significant. Thus, tables 5 and 7
yield the same implications for the effect of
BHC affiliation on capital injections: it is the size
of BHCs relative to the size of their troubled
bank subsidiaries that influences capital injec-
tion ratios.
Economic Signfficance of Affilia~
tion with BilL’s for Capital
Injections
The empirical results support the hypothesis
that BHC subsidiaries receive larger capital in-
jections than other troubled banks. But are the
effects of affiliation with BHCs on capital injec-
tions large enough to be economically signifi-
cant? If the BHC effect is estimated to yield only
a few extra dollars for a typical troubled bank,
the statistically significant effects could be dis-
missed easily as being economically irrelevant.
Economic significance can be gauged by esti-
mating the difference between the capital injec-
tion ratios of a BHC subsidiary and an indepen-
dent bank with identical values of the other
independent variables. These effects could be
estimated alternatively using the results in tables
S or 7. Table 7 is used because its maximum
likelihood test statistics are larger, indicating
greater explanatory power of the equations.
Estimation of the size of the effect of affilia-
tion with BHCs involves an analysis of the size
of the regression coefficient. As explained in the
insert on Tobit analysis, the regression coeffi-
cients must be multiplied by the probability of
the dependent variable being greater than zero
(the fraction at the bottom of the table) to esti-
mate the effects of a unit change in an indepen-
dent variable on the size of the dependent vari-
able. In table 7, the fraction is 0.2817 for the
second equation (Texas banks) and 0.5147 for
the fourth equation (banks located elsewhere).
These equations are used in the analysis of the
economic significance of affiliation with BHCs
on capital injections.
The estimates of BHC effects on the size of
capital injections are presented in table 8. These
effects are assumed to be zero unless the re-
gression coefficients are significantly different
from zero at the 5 percent level. They are cal-
culated as follows: Suppose a troubled bank in
Texas, with total assets of less than $25 million,
is a subsidiary of a BHC whose total assets are
greater than $100 million but less than or equal
to $1 billion, Compared with an independent
bank of the same size and characteristics other
than BHC affiliation, the capital injection is esti-
mated to be higher at the BHC subsidiary by
1.67 percent of its total assets, which is calcu-
lated as 0.0592 (the coefficient on BHCI000)
times 0.2817, the adjustment to regression coef-
ficients appropriate for Tobit analysis. The effect
for a subsidiary of a BHC of similar size that
has total assets between $25 million and $50
million is estimated as follows:
(0.0592 — 0.0399)0.2817 0.0054.
These estimates have a consistent pattern: in a
given size range, capital injection ratios are
larger for banks that are subsidiaries of larger
BHCs, and smaller for larger bank subsidiaries.
The effects of BHC affiliation can be stated in
dollar terms by assuming certain asset sizes for
the representative BHC subsidiaries. For in-
stance, suppose the troubled bank has total
assets of $tS million and is a subsidiary of a
BHC with total assets between $100 million and $1 billion. Its capital injection is estimated to be
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dependent bank.17 While this paper presents no
criterion for economic significance, these effects
are too large to be dismissed as economically
insignificant.
Holding Company Affiliation’s In-
fluence on the Incidence of Bank
Failure
The influence of RHCS on capital injections af-
fects how one interprets some recent studies of
the determinants of bank failure. Belongia and
Gilbert (1990) find that increases in RHCS reduce
the probability of bank failure. Gajewski (1989)
reports a similar finding: the larger the number
of bank subsidiaries in a BHC, the lower the
probability of failure by its subsidiary banks.
This study indicates that the lower probability
of failure by bank subsidiaries of large,
multibank holding companies results,
in part, from the larger capital injections by
multibank holding companies into their troubled
banks.
CONCLUSION
The Federal Reserve Board expects BHCs to
serve as sources of strength for their bank sub-
sidiaries. BHCs can do so by injecting capital in-
to their troubled subsidiaries when losses re-
duce their capital ratios below levels acceptable
to bank supervisors.
This paper examines whether BHCs have in-
jected relatively more capital into their troubled
subsidiaries than the owners of similarly troubled
independent banks, holding constant the values
of other determinants of capital injections. The
empirical results indicate that the BHC effect
depends on the total banking assets of the l3HCs
as well as the assets of their troubled bank sub-
sidiaries. BHCs with total assets that are at least
50 times larger than those of their troubled sub-
sidiaries tend to inject more capital into those
subsidiaries than other bank owners inject into
their banks.
These results are consistent with the view
that BHCs weigh the effects of capital injections
on their reputations in the financial markets,
and with the Board, against the opportunity
cost of such injections. The results are also con-
sistent with recent studies which found that the
subsidiaries of relatively large BHCs have a
lower probability of failure than other banks
with similar characteristics—their lower failure
rate reflects large capital injections into such
banks
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